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ABSTRACT   Studies on demand side mechanisms related to experience goods argue that demand is driven by 
recommendation and reputation. In an auditing context, research showed that both of these mechanisms play 
an important role in determining partner selection, however, only when the mechanisms are observed in 
isolation. On this basis, this study raises a concern about whether the mechanisms are mutually exclusive, and 
if not, how does recommendation and reputation in auditor selection context create an interplay in the process 
of auditor selection. We test our hypotheses on network data of Danish public companies. Findings from the 
social network study indicate that auditor selection is a sensitive and complex task for boards of directors, as 
it is not only driven by either of the mechanisms. Rather, partner selection is driven by the combination of both 
recommendation and reputation, which creates the interplay and, thus, indicates that the demand mechanisms 
are not mutually exclusive and should not be observed in isolation of one another. 
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1. Introduction 
This study addresses the following research question: How does recommendation and reputation, as 
two demand mechanisms, create an interplay in the auditor selection process? The purpose of this 
paper is to identify whether, and how, the co-existence of recommendation and reputation-based 
demand side mechanisms in corporate governance system influences audit partner selection. The 
research question aims at challenging earlier theoretical assumptions on demand side mechanisms 
that assist buyers in differentiating experience goods (Davis & Robbins, 2004; Granovetter, 1973; 
Nelson, 1970; Podolny, 2001; Powell, 1990; Saxton, 1997), in which the previous studies argued that 
demand preferences are driven by either one of the two mechanisms (Beattie & Fearnley, 1998; Magri 
& Baldacchino, 2004; Woo & Koh, 2001; Neveling, 2006; Kacanski, 2017; Johansen & Pettersson, 
2013). Arguably, taking into account such a perspective, the studies disregarded reflections on the 
potential synergetic effect of the two epistemologically detached theoretical standpoints on auditor 
choices. 
Previous studies expressed significant interest toward pursuing the research on understanding 
and discussing consequences that corporate auditor choice or switch of auditor have for companies’ 
businesses (e.g. Beattie & Fearnley, 1998; Magri & Baldacchino, 2004; Woo & Koh, 2001; Chang et 
al., 2019). Researchers’ concerns were primarily focused on the aftereffects of the selection 
processes, in which the results were streamlined toward identification of auditor choice impacts on 
companies’ financial position, value of assets, market share volatility, and company’s reputation 
(Beattie & Fearnley, 1998; Magri & Baldacchino, 2004; Woo & Koh, 2001; Neveling, 2006). By 
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repositioning the discussion from the aftereffects of selection to the actual selection, this paper 
pursues further investigation of the underlying mechanisms that actually determine the auditor 
selection processes (Davis & Robbins, 2004; Granovetter, 1973; Nelson, 1970; Podolny, 2001; 
Powell, 1990; Saxton, 1997).  
Prior research on auditor choices and auditor switch was polarized around the two theoretical 
assumptions, as studies primarily followed the argument that demand side mechanisms that assist 
buyers in differentiating experience goods are either driven by recommendation or reputation (Davis 
& Robbins, 2004; Granovetter, 1973; Nelson, 1970; Podolny, 2001; Powell, 1990; Saxton, 1997). 
However, such a duality of standpoints has only been implicitly addressed in the literature, as 
researchers considered either mechanism merely as a precondition to the development of theoretical 
argumentations. As a result, the exclusiveness of the operationalization of the either of them from 
empirical observations led toward dissemination of relevant but, at the same time, potentially 
conflicting results (Beattie & Fearnley, 1998; Magri & Baldacchino, 2004; Woo & Koh, 2001; 
Neveling, 2006; Kacanski, 2017; Johansen & Pettersson, 2013). In particular, different studies 
revealed that within the same research context both of the mechanisms have significant influence on 
general propensity of auditor selection, but under the implicit assumption that the effects of the 
alternative mechanism are not present in the same model of observation (e.g. Kacanski, 2017; 
Johansen & Pettersson, 2013). Consequently, such a misalignment between theoretical assumptions 
on potential mutual exclusiveness and the presence of the significances of both of them, raises the 
dilemma of whether those mechanisms, in fact, are mutually exclusive, or they are potentially 
interdependent (Lusher et al., 2013). On the contrary, the concern is primarily of whether, within the 
mutual observation, either one is actually more prevalent than the another, or they jointly construct 
the platform based on which the auditor selection process unfolds. 
At the theoretical level, we mobilize the literature on cross-board relations as a mechanism of 
diffusion of corporate decisions (e.g. Davis & Greve, 1997; Larcker et al., 2005; Ortiz-de-Mandojana 
et al., 2012; Johansen & Pettersson, 2013), and reputation driven incentives for social selection (Saito 
and Takeda, 2014; Kacanski, 2017) to develop hypotheses. Following the literature and conditioning 
the argument on the assumption of the existence of interdependency (Lusher et al., 2013), we assert 
that, it is, in fact, possible to argue that both mechanisms could potentially be taken into consideration 
by corporate boards during the process of auditor selection. While assuming that the nature of 
selection is relational and that the asymmetrical information might co-exist in a buyer-seller 
relationship (OECD, 2009), we measure the significances of the effects of both mechanisms with the 
presence of variables pertaining to both theoretical standpoints.  
Our sample includes information on supervisory board members (non-executive directors) 
and their audit partner choices that are collected for all publicly listed companies in Denmark in the 
period 2010-2014. We use Danish data because partner-level data are available, but also because 
there is a long tradition of strong relations between members of supervisory boards and external 
auditors, both legally and in practice. Also, the network of interlocking directors in Denmark is 
extensive, meaning that each board, on average, has 1.2 interlocking directors (Kacanski et al., 2017). 
On this basis, we assume that it is, in fact, possible to expect that individuals representing multiple 
boards play an important role in auditor choice at all the boards they represent. To test the hypotheses, 
we conduct network study by using exponential random graph models – ERGMs (e.g. Wang et al., 
2013; Lusher, 2013) to account on interdependency (Robins, 2015) between the mechanisms. 
The results of the study demonstrate that both demand mechanisms are positive and 
significant, considering the fulfillment of the condition of interdependency. This implies that cross-
board knowledge sharing and reputation have equally important impacts on boards’ decisions. 
Accordingly, the findings suggest that reputation and recommendation together characterize the audit 
partner selection network. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3549760
 4 
This study makes several contributions. First, our study contributes to the existing research, 
by extending our understanding of demand side mechanisms that assist buyers in differentiating 
goods as factors influencing the social process in auditor selection context. Earlier studies, while 
observing the mechanisms in isolation, treated individuals as an aggregation of individuals (Abbott, 
1997:1152; White et al., 1976, Lusher et al., 2013) instead of considering them as self-contained 
social actors. By recombining the initially given theoretical distinction in the same study, and by 
accounting on their joint presence, we are able to provide more precise understanding of the role that 
those mechanisms collectively play on auditor choice. To the best of our knowledge, there are only 
two studies that, in auditor selection context, have observed recommendation and reputation 
mechanisms from network perspective (Johansen & Pettersson, 2013; Kacanski, 2017) as mutually 
exclusive processes. By identifying this, we argue that the process of corporate decision making on 
auditor engagement is a result of a combination of personal preferences based on experiences and 
recommendations given by the others, rather than merely the result of one of these mechanisms. 
Second, we add to the research on determinants of social networks as a central component of 
auditor selection mechanisms to generate new knowledge by recombining the existing knowledge 
(Kacanski, 2017; Johansen & Pettersson, 2013). The application of social network analysis 
methodology, particularly exponential random graph models (Wang et al., 2013), enables us to gain 
insights into the underlying processes that create and sustain the network-based social system. 
ERGMs, as tie-based models, enable a comprehension of how and why social networks arise. 
Particularly, they permit integration of multiple theoretical assumptions (Monge and Contractor, 
2003) while maintaining the premise of individuality of individuals in networks (Lusher et al., 2013). 
Therefore, in this study we assume that individuals are de-categorized actors who, as intentional 
beings, might have multiple motivations and multiple expressions of social action (Lusher and 
Robins, 2013). Consequently, following earlier research, in this study we assume that segregations 
confined the potential for expanding theoretical discussions toward understanding of the interplay, 
and we aim to address this gap in the study.  
Third, our study is important for both audit practitioners and members of corporate boards. 
Particularly, audit practitioners (partners) may benefit from this study as they should take into 
consideration that tenures and engagement of new clients are both influenced by their own position 
in the audit partner network, but also the assemblage of boards of directors. Also, it is important for 
partners to acknowledge that directors who interlock have equally important function in the process 
of auditor selection, as much as that function could be given to the importance of reputation of audit 
partner as an individual node in audit partner network for the focal clients. Finally, corporate board 
members may also benefit from the outcome of this research by recognizing that decision-making 
processes are rather prone to a combination of both self-driven perceptions and social influences 
instead of being driven solely by either of these. 
The paper is divided into five sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 reviews existing 
literature on recommendation and reputation-driven auditor selection. Section 3 provides information 
on the particular Danish context, describes data collection process and outlines the research method. 
Section 4 presents findings related to the impacts that the two demand-side mechanisms have on 
companies in relation to the auditor selection. Section 5 discusses the findings with the particular 
emphasis on the interplay between the mechanisms in the process of a determination of auditor 
selection decisions. This section ends with concluding remarks. 
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2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
2.1. Social Influence and Social Selection Processes – A Network Perspective 
Social networks consist of individuals and the relational ties they establish with others in their 
proximity. Ties may carry various types of information, such as friendship, collaboration, etc., where 
the network itself is characterized by the dyadic social linkages (Robins et al., 2001). It is in the nature 
of social actors to form ties with some, but not all the actors that are present in the same network 
(Robins et al., 2001). This is because of the subjective nature of individuals’ judgments (e.g. 
motivations, incentives, reasons) involved in making decisions about who to establish ties with 
(Lusher and Robins, 2013). As a consequence, the reality of social network emergence, which 
presupposes the de-categorization of individuals, appears to be more complex, as the individuals are 
considered as a priori decategorized actors who are individualized in their social presence (Lusher 
and Robins, 2013). 
 The social network theory distinguishes between the two types of social processes, which may 
be used to understanding the mechanisms by which networks unfold. The distinction is made 
according to a criterion of which driver led to the emergence of ties. Drivers could be either the 
relational ties themselves, or attributes held by social actors in the network (Robins et al., 2001). 
Firstly, in social influence processes, an existing network structure (i.e. presence or absence of ties) 
can affect tie emergence, as the individuals may be influenced by the others, with whom they have 
established ties (Robins et al., 2001; Lusher and Robins, 2013; Lusher et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013, 
2016). Secondly, when individuals’ attributes drive the formation or change of network ties, it is 
referred to social selection processes.  
 Social influence, also called network diffusion or network contagion, is fundamentally 
concerned with the ways in which individuals affect the behaviour of the others they are connected 
with (Mason et al., 2007). According to Mason et al. (2007), ties between two social actors may cause 
assimilation and conformity between the two, as the behavior of one actor might influence the 
behavior of the other. This implies that two individuals who share the same tie are more likely to 
form ties with the same others, than what would be probable in the absence of that tie. For those 
purposes, network methods may be used to predict individual outcomes given the network structure, 
for instance, when individual’s responses are assumed to relate to the responses of network patterns 
(Friedkin, 2006; Mason et al., 2007).  
In social selection, when the structure of ties in networks is the research issue, network 
structure may be self-organized into various patterns, in which the tie formation, or dissolution, is 
driven by individuals’ attributes (Robins et al., 2001). In contrast with social influence, social 
selection is mainly concerned with the role that the actors’ characteristics take on those combined 
actor/tie locales. In this perspective, attributes are used to explain social ties. According to this 
mechanism, individuals are more likely to form ties with those who embody a specific attribute, than 
with those to who are missing that attribute. 
 Although Erickson (1988) asserted that, for research purposes, it may be more profitable to 
simplify the theoretical and analytical tasks by ignoring one process while examining the other, 
another group of researchers argued that these two processes are not mutually exclusive, but rather, 
are, intertwined (e.g. Leenders, 1997). In social network theory, social influence is operationalized 
through network endogenous patterns, while social selection considers attributes as exogenous 
predictors of network structure (Lusher et al., 2013). According to Lusher et al. (2013), parametric 
analysis of social processes should, in fact, include both. This should be done in a manner that, when 
exogenous predictors are research issue, then endogenous patterns should have the function of a 
control mechanism for network diffusion, and vice versa. 
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 For the purpose of this paper, we take into account both of those functions inherent to the both 
mechanisms. We take this view, because the natures of recommendation and reputation mechanisms 
are fundamentally opposed, when regarded from both theoretical and methodological perspectives. 
More concretely, we categorize recommendation mechanism as a driver of endogenous network 
patterns (interlocking directorships as cross board ties), and reputation as exogenous tie predictor 
(audit partner’s attribute). Thus, in the explanation of the recommendation processes, reputation 
attribute effect is used as a control variable, while recommendation controls reputation-driven tie 
emergence when reputation is the focus of a discussion. Therefore, by defining the mechanisms in 
such a way, we ensure the presence of a condition of interdependency between them. 
 
2.2. Duality of Demand side Mechanisms in Auditor Selection Context 
Social network research has identified that either recommendation or reputation assist buyers in 
differentiation of experience goods (Davis & Robbins, 2004; Granovetter, 1973; Nelson, 1970; 
Podolny, 2001; Powell, 1990; Saxton, 1997). Experience goods are defined here as products or 
services whose quality cannot be evaluated accurately before they are purchased and experienced by 
consumers (OECD, 2009). The fact that audits are categorized as experience goods makes the 
differentiation of audits particularly problematic due to the asymmetry of information between the 
buyer and the seller about quality of audits offered at the audit market (OECD, 2009). That asymmetry 
is apparent in both mechanisms where decisions on auditor selection seem to be justified in alternative 
ways, specifically when there is a lack of an experience of the quality of audits.  
Indicating the duality of demand side mechanisms, studies found that both recommendation 
and reputation have an influence on client’s choice of auditor (Beattie & Fearnley, 1998; Magri & 
Baldacchino, 2004; Woo & Koh, 2001; Mayhew, 2001; Kacanski, 2017; Linthicum et al., 2010, 
Johansen & Pettersson, 2013). On one hand, from the recommendation perspective, literature 
demonstrated that board members who sit on multiple boards of directors represent an important 
source of information about experiences with auditors related to costing and behavioral aspects 
related to assurance services (Beattie & Fearnley, 1998; Magri & Baldacchino, 2004; Woo & Koh, 
2001; Herrbach, 2001). Thus, the existence of interlocks between boards of directors serves as an 
indicator of a potential assimilation of decisions on auditor selection at those boards who share the 
same member. On the other hand, the literature emphasized that reputation, which represents a direct 
surrogate for quality experience (Shapiro, 1983, Mayhew, 2001), is also an important determinant of 
a company’s choice of auditor (Kacanski, 2017; Linthicum et al., 2010). From this perspective, 
reputation serves as an indicator of audit quality that gives additional value to the annual reports, 
which may be important to external users of financial information who have investment incentives 
(Mayhew, 2001). 
In the following, we provide the outline of relevant literature, upon which the hypotheses are 
defined. We do this in order to outline theoretical arguments developed in earlier research that are 
related to both demand mechanisms, after which we will move on to the definition of the hypotheses. 
 
2.3. An Interplay of Recommendation and Reputation Mechanisms in Auditor Selection Process 
The study on the American corporate elite by Davis et al. (2003) showed that ideas and rumors 
discussed at one company in a face-to-face communication may reach up to 97% of all the largest 
companies’ boards in a relative short period. In this study, they demonstrated that cross-board 
communication plays a vital role in spreading information, thereby indicating that ties between boards 
may be strong enough that the actual distances between remote boards might be surprisingly short, 
even though the boards seem to be disconnected (Davis et al., 2003; Sinani et al., 2008). The construct 
of a ‘small world’ they develop shows that board-to-board ties, in fact, exist, regardless of the fact 
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that the ties might not seem to be obvious. Precisely those ties may be an indication of a mechanism 
for identification of a presence of diffusion of corporate practices, strategies and structures between 
the connected boards (Davis et al., 2003). This indication shows that in order to understand a board’s 
decisions, it is necessary to identify relations that a focal board has established with the other boards. 
This is because the decisions of one board may rather be a function of cross-board communication 
than a corporate self-practice, which aside from assimilation of practices among connected companies 
also enables the focal company to justify decisions by providing that sense of comfort. In the light of 
this, the literature argued that interlock ties, in fact, may serve as intermediaries in the process of 
spreading of information on experiences between the boards (Bouwman, 2011; Chiu et al., 2009; Rao 
et al., 2000; Davis & Greve, 1997). 
In the context of this study, audits are categorized as experience goods since their quality 
cannot be determined before the service is provided, report delivered, and finally, evaluated by the 
clients (Davis & Robbins, 2004; Granovetter, 1973; Nelson, 1970; Podolny, 2001; Powell, 1990; 
Saxton, 1997). Because of the lack of information on quality of audits, boards tend to obtain that 
information from the others, particularly those who already have experienced the quality. Since the 
auditor selection process is principally categorized as uncertain (Podolny, 1994), relations with the 
other boards would permit the focal boards to make informed decisions on which auditor to appoint 
(Podolny, 2001). In this way, directors who interlock act as mediators, or ‘pipes’, in this cross-board 
recommendation-sharing processes (Podolny, 2001). As a result, a temporal/periodical character of 
board members’ engagements with different companies enables them to be the core social actors 
influencing the outcomes of decision-making processes in all the boards they represent (Granovetter, 
2005; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Shropshire, 2010).  
Podolny (2001) argued that the networks, which represent the combination of ties established 
between the companies, can be the ‘pipes of the market’ as they work as ‘the channels of conducts 
through which “market stuff” flows, where the “market stuff” encompasses information about 
exchange opportunities’ (Johansen & Pettersson, 2013). By acknowledging that cross-board ties are 
critical to corporate decisions (Bouwman, 2011; Chiu et al., 2009; Baker, 1990; Uzzi & Lancaster, 
2004), a number of studies were developed to address the function that those ties have in an auditor 
selection context (e.g. Beattie & Fearnley, 1998; Magri & Baldacchino, 2004; Woo & Koh, 2001). 
Literature showed that the presence of supervisory directors on boards of directors who hold multiple 
affiliations have a fundamental role in the process of the spread of information about ideas, 
experiences and practices that may further impact the decision-making processes in a focal company 
(Bizjak, Lemmon & Whitby, 2009; Bouwman, 2011; Chiu, Teoh & Tian, 2009; Davis & Greve, 1997; 
Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Haunschild, 1993; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Horton, Millo & 
Serafeim, 2012; Larcker et al., 2005; Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al., 2012; Rao, Davis &Ward, 2000; 
Beattie & Fearnley, 1998; Magri & Baldacchino, 2004).  
In this context, the uncertainty involved in auditor choice gives prominence to social networks 
as a possible explanation of auditor selection process (Seabright, 1992). Literature on uncertainties 
that are involved in auditor choices suggest that the way in which networks are used to mitigate 
uncertainty depends on whether the uncertainty is company specific or market-based (Beckman et 
al., 2004). While the company specific uncertainty enables the companies to select partners who are 
unknown, as a form of exploration, the latter leads the boards to re-select the partners they already 
interacted with in order to minimize risks (Beckman et al., Podolny, 1994). As all the buyers of audits 
bear certain level of risk, the network perspective advocates that previous experiences are likely to 
impact decisions, as they provide knowledge and a basis for evaluation (Podolny, 2004), along with 
the information about the reliability and capability of a potential partner (Beckman et al., 2004). Such 
knowledge sharing between boards is assumed to be valuable to focal board since board colleagues 
are considered to be a ‘trusted source’ of knowledge (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001), as the 
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information shared between two boards through interlocks are perceived as not being observable by 
outsiders (Shropshire, 2010). Therefore, focal boards would expect from board members who 
interlock to bring their knowledge about partners they acquired during engagements in other 
companies to the focal company. Social network research showed that if the focal company is able to 
access referrals about a potential partner from a connected company, then it is likely that the focal 
company will engage that partner (Baker, 1990; Uzzi, 1996). This further reflects the preference for 
embedded relationships (Baum et al., 2005; Shipilov, 2012) and the need for trust and certainties 
(Beckman et al., 2004; Podolny, 1994) that lead to reduction of the risks of making uninformed 
auditor choices. By predicting that this logic operates in the audit market when non-executive 
directors on the focal board are connected to potentially incoming auditors via their position on an 
interlock board, studies found a positive association between the connection between non-executive 
directors with the likelihood that the audit partner is selected (Johansen and Pettersson, 2013). 
On the other hand, in recent discussions on auditor choices it became apparent that buyers of 
audits, instead of basing decisions on previous experiences, tended to base their choices of preferred 
audit partner on the level of focal partner’s reputation (Magri & Baldacchino, 2004; Kacanski, 2017). 
Although the concept of reputation is one of the two demand side mechanisms to enable 
differentiation of experience goods, it has relatively recently taken over the spotlight in auditing 
research. Magri & Baldacchino (2004) stated the importance of extending discussions on reputation-
driven auditor selection by arguing that the social perception of an auditor may impact the social 
perception of the focal company as well, which afterwards plays role in determination the company’s 
social standing. Craik (2009) asserted that reputation rather operates at the level of network, rather 
than on an actor level. Also, it has the capacity to recreate structures of social relationships, as 
incentives of a particular actor determine the distribution of network dynamics (Craik, 2009). 
Regardless of rich theoretical debates on the meaning of the concept of reputation, there is a 
common ground based on which the concept is understood. Reputation – an intangible asset 
(Goldberg et al., 2003) – is understood as a perceptual representation of one’s past actions and future 
prospects that describes their overall social appeal (Fombrun, 1996: 72). Reputation is a value that 
emerges in the eyes of others (Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999; Turban & Cable, 2003), and its value 
can be both positive and negative (Brewer et al., 2002; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001, Highhouse et al., 
2009). It is considered as an objective measure of perceptual identity that is estimated by a 
combination of particularly defined criteria (Brewer et al., 2002; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), whose 
socially constructed measure comes from appraisals given by individuals’ perceptions (Lopez et al., 
2010). Reputation is difficult to obtain and a fragile commodity that may be easily lost (Miles & 
Covin, 2002), because it is not self-attainable (Turban & Cable, 2003). In this paper we use the 
definition from Zinko et al. (2007), who defined reputation as ‘a perceptual identity formed from the 
collective perceptions of others, which is reflective of the complex combination of salient personal 
characteristics and accomplishments, demonstrated behavior, and intended images presented over 
some period of time as observed directly and/or reported from secondary sources, which reduces 
ambiguity about expected future behavior’. The concept of reputation is built on a combination of 
attributes which, in summary, give reputation scores that may be assigned to any social actor, i.e. 
individuals, companies, organizations etc. (e.g. The Reputation Institute1). For those social actors 
considered as reputable, it is typical that they have competitive advantages relative to others, which 
further enables them to sustain their own viability (Barney, 1991; Deephouse, 2000).  
 
1 The Reputation Institute (RepTrakâ) provides quantitative measures of company reputation scores appraised by the 
following seven categories: product/service, innovation, workplace, governance, citizenship, leadership and performance. 
The scores aim at helping different stakeholders to more objectively perceive the level of legitimacy and trustworthiness 
of focal business entities (Parkhe, 1993). 
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The expansion of the Big Four audit firms on international markets is closely related to the 
provision of high-quality audit and advisory services, which enabled the audit firms to gain an 
eminent reputation worldwide (Saito & Takeda, 2014). Conversely, should the Big Four auditors 
deliver low quality audits, they increase the risk of losing their positive reputation (DeAngelo, 1981). 
Centralization of governance of the Big Four makes them susceptible not only to local audit scandals 
but also to central audit failures, as seen in the infamous Arthur Andersen’s scandal with regard to 
the Enron case in October 2001. Aronmwan et al. (2013) developed three categories of audit firms: 
(1) Big Four, (2) BDO and Grand Thornton, and (3) all the other firms, stating that both audit quality 
and reputation may be inferred by an audit firm category. Also, Mayhew (2001) asserts that reputation 
has cyclical transitive formation process, assembled of three actors who jointly scale auditor 
reputation level – clients, investors and auditors. Where clients, with incentives to boost the quality 
of financial statements, engage reputable auditors to attract potential investors, who require reliable 
information to make investment decisions, while auditors are interested in providing the best quality 
of audits to prove themselves as good auditors (Mayhew, 2001). Because of the importance of public 
image for business entities, companies are likely to express their readiness to pay audit premiums, 
which is considered to be a direct investment in companies’ public image (Johansen & Pettersson, 
2013), in order to receive audit services from those auditors considered reputable (Magri & 
Baldacchino, 2004). This further leads to companies’ increased expectations related to raising the 
credibility of both the business entity and their financial statements (Simunic & Stein, 1987).  
Several studies have been conducted to identify potential presence of reputation effect on 
auditor choice (e.g. Asthana et al., 2007; Kanagaretham et al., 2010; Almer et al., 2014; Aronmwan 
et al., 2013; Kacanski, 2017). Literature suggested that clients tend to express the interest in paying 
audit fee premiums, as relations with them enable the companies to boost own social image 
(Kacanski, 2017; Asthana et al., 2007; Kanagaretham et al., 2010; Almer et al., 2014; Aronmwan et 
al., 2013). Engaging reputable partners has multiple positive implications for corporate social 
standing, where one indication is the positive change in stock market value (Ashtana et al., 2007). 
However, not all choices of partners ensure enhancements in company’s reputation. Studies found 
that the switch between audit firm categories is less favorable for both stock market and reputation if 
the change is made from Big Four to non-Big Four, than if otherwise (Moizer, 1997). This is due to 
the fact that the first scenario could be publicly perceived as a positive signal for future growth 
prospects, whereas the latter might signalize difficulties (Brocard, Franke, & Voeller, 2018). Social 
network research proves the previous arguments by demonstrating that companies are prone to 
selection of reputable audit partners (Kacanski, 2017). The selection of reputable partners serves as a 
tool for status transfer through which companies identify themselves, which further increase the 
recognition in the social environment to which the focal company belongs. Accordingly, the relation 
with reputable partner may also serve as a remedy for re-boosting of social standing for those 
companies that have established relations with those who have lower reputation levels (Kacanski, 
2017). 
In summary, the previous literature asserts that both cross-board knowledge transfer and 
auditor reputation have important functions in auditor selection, however, only when each of them is 
observed in isolation from the potential effects of the other. From the social network theory 
perspective, which presupposes the interdependence between those two mechanisms, the existence 
of a potential interplay between the two mechanisms is understated in the previous literature, because 
the studies did not account for a possible prevalence of one mechanism in the mutual presence of the 
other to argue for their significances. 
Acknowledging the literature which argued that interlocks establish for a particular purpose, 
e.g. shared ownership, capital allocation, or formation of interdependencies between companies (e.g. 
Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988; Pfeffer, 1972; Allen, 1978, Stockman et al., 1985; Zeitlin, 1974; Pfeffer 
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and Salanc 1978), the interlocks could also be driven by incentives of focal boards to use interlock 
ties as a strategy for increasing proximity with potential audit partner (Podolny, 2001; Baker, 1990; 
Uzzi and Lancaster, 2004; Courtney and Jubb, 2005), who is considered as reputable (Magri & 
Baldacchino, 2004). Negotiations with reputable partners on audit engagements may be challenging 
for some companies, as auditors may be less willing to accept the new engagements. This is because 
the reputable partners are usually under pressure with current audits (Linthicum et al., 2001), and 
therefore, are highly selective when it comes to the new clients, as they want to protect their reputation 
through a minimization of risk of failure they could be exposed to due to a lack of knowledge about 
the new client. However, it would be possible to expect that an interlock between the two boards 
could be an outcome of a strategy for increasing proximity with the reputable partner for the focal 
company, which further increases likelihood of acceptance of new engagements by reputable 
partners. This is because the reputable partners are more willing to accept the offer for engagements 
received from the new client, if their existing client has an interlock with the focal company (Podolny, 
2001; Baker, 1990; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2004; Courtney and Jubb, 2005).  
In formal terms, we would expect that recommendation driven interlock-based incentives 
enable the reputation mechanism to release in auditor selection context, which further predicts that it 
is not only likely that boards who share board member will engage the same partner, but also that this 
partner is expected to be a reputable one. In this sense, we could predict that the interplay between 
recommendation and reputation exists, and that the partner selection is not driven by either 
mechanism, which implies that they are not mutually exclusive, but that they jointly create a platform 
upon which the selection of partners unfolds. As a result, we expect to find that both reputation and 
recommendation mechanisms are important drivers of network structure when both of them are 
present in the estimation of a propensity of network tie emergence, where such an outcome would 
further indicate that the two of them create an interplay in establishing the social network structure. 
 
First, following the assumption that both recommendation and reputation play a role in auditor 
selection process we predict the following: 
 
H1a: The recommendation mechanism has significant influence on auditor selection process when 
reputation effect is present in the observation. 
H1b: The reputation mechanism has significant influence on auditor selection when recommendation effect 
is present in the observation.   
 
Second, by observing both of them in their joint presence and conditioning on interdependence 
between the mechanisms, we define the following hypothesis:  
 
H2: Recommendation and reputation mechanisms create an interplay in auditor selection process. 
  
The empirical results of the test of the hypotheses here are not ex ante obvious, since conditional 
interdependence between the mechanisms observed through the lenses of network methodology that 
enables testing the interplay between them may result in statistical significance of one out of two 
alternative mechanisms. This is because the effect of one of them may give insignificant parameter 
estimate due to a potential prevalence of the other one within the same observation – which earlier 
research did not address. Therefore, we assert that it is important to first reflect upon the existence of 
significances of both mechanisms in a joint model in which both of them are present, in order to use 
this as a valid assumption to discuss the presence of an interplay between the two mechanisms. 
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3. Research Context, Data and Method 
To investigate the interplay of recommendation and reputation as demand-side mechanisms related 
to experience goods on auditor selection processes, we use data that are collected as part of a larger 
study on the development of social selection mechanisms in a Danish corporate governance context 
(Kacanski, 2017). The following section provides further information on the corporate governance 
system in Denmark, together with the source of network data and analytical frameworks. 
 
3.1. The Corporate Governance System in Denmark 
The Danish system of corporate governance is a classical two-tier arrangement comprised of 
supervisory board members and executive directors (Johansen & Pettersson, 2013; Kacanski, 2017; 
Sundgren, 1998).  
According to the European directive on statutory audits, each supervisory board of directors 
is obliged to appoint an audit firm. Supervisory boards announce decisions on the selection of 
statutory auditors at the annual general meeting (AGM). Decisions on auditor appointments are 
preceded by the board’s examination of potential auditors, where the examination is conducted only 
on those auditors recommended by audit committees (Johansen & Pettersson, 2013).  
The Danish regulation on mandatory audits (Revisorkommissionen, 2006) legislated to limit 
the freedom to conduct joint audits in 2005, which had been in effect since 1930, and similar 
regulations are still in effect in other countries such as France (Thingaard & Kietzner, 2008). This 
regulation prevents companies from simultaneously engaging more than one audit firm, in order to 
suppress the development of conflicts of interest and remove potential risks of misalignments in 
opinions caused by differences in audit methodologies used by audit firms (Revisorkommissionen, 
2006). Moreover, this regulation obliges the audit partners, who represent the audit team leaders, to 
personally sign off on audit reports, which is considered an indication of the responsibility that the 
partners take on in their engagements with clients. It is common audit practice that two audit partners 
sign off on a single audit report, although there are a few examples of a single audit partner signature. 
This regulation is aimed at transferring accountability for audits from audit firms to partners in order 
to reduce audit firms’ exposure to partners’ failures. 
 
3.1.1. The Role of Auditors and Boards 
In Denmark, the duality of function between the chief executive officer and the chairperson of the 
non-executive board is strongly prohibited. This implies that supervisory board members are the only 
ones allowed affiliations with multiple boards, while the same rule does not apply to executive 
directors.   
The Danish corporate governance system is characterized by a long tradition of strong 
relations between members of supervisory boards and external auditors, both legally and in practice. 
On one hand, financial statements are the responsibility of both the supervisory board and the 
management board (Johansen & Pettersson, 2013), unlike in the US, where they are the responsibility 
of executive management (Bush, 2005). Since 1917, external auditors are also obliged to compose a 
long form of audit report for the supervisory boards, describing audit findings in detail. The long form 
of audit reports is similar to the ‘additional report to the audit committee’ proposed by the European 
Commission (2011). The report is kept confidential as the auditor record at the company’s premises, 
and must be accessible at every board meeting. Lastly, company law stipulates requirements for 
supervisory boards to consider when they are assessing auditors and audit findings. Accordingly, the 
supervisory board and the auditors are strongly connected in both intent and effect in the Danish 
corporate governance system (Johansen & Pettersson, 2013). 
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3.2. Data 
In order to observe the auditor selection mechanism and investigate the prevalence of network 
structuring effects, we model multiple social selection across a period of five years, from 2010 to 
2014. Aside from limiting our sample period to avoid changes in corporate laws and audit regulations, 
we also keep our case separated from two relatively recent mergers that took place in Denmark in 
2008 and 2014. We do this in order to observe mechanisms across the substantially stable period in 
order to understand what tendencies toward auditor selection exist during the observed period. The 
results from our study may be further utilized as a control model for observing disturbances which 
may occur if regulatory changes or changes at audit firm level occur.  
To investigate how interlocking directorship networ272ks interfere with auditor selection 
processes in relation to the duality of the demand mechanisms of this study, we collected relational 
data for the Danish case from publicly available annual financial statements. We selected the samples 
from companies that were listed on the Danish stock exchange for each of the five years. The list of 
companies was identified via ‘interim reports on equity trading’ published by Nasdaq OMX 
Copenhagen on 31 December for each year of observation. Those reports comprise information about 
companies’ assets that have been listed and de-listed during those years. Based on the lists of 
companies, we collected the annual statements for each company from Virk.dk, companies’ websites 
or by directly contacting companies’ investor relation departments to collect missing data.  
In total we accumulated 774 annual statements for an average of 155 companies per year for 
each observation from 2010 to 2014. The condition of completeness for network studies was fulfilled 
(Robins, 2015), as we collected data that matches the entire population of all Danish listed companies. 
Data about board members and audit partners were collected from a total of 191 unique business 
entities across the five-year period. Business entities that were considered for the investigation 
include both financial and non-financial organizations. The total number of 1761 unique board 
members, including the 297 audit partners who signed off their audit reports and were affiliated with 
17 audit firms in all, were extracted from the annual statements. 
Reputation scores were developed as binary attributes by partially following the argument of 
Aronmwan et al. (2013). Instead of categorizing companies into three levels, we categorized 
companies either as reputable or non-reputable, depending on whether they belonged to the Big Four 
or non-Big Four, respectively. Since our models deal with individuals and not with audit firms, 
partners who were affiliated with a Big Four audit firms during the particular year of observation 
received the attribute 1, or 0 if there was no affiliation. 
In order to prepare the data for statistical modeling, we first extracted all relevant data on 
actors, relations and attributes and entered into a single spreadsheet, which was further converted into 
the .csv file readable in Visone (Brandes & Wagner, 2004). The latter is a network visualization tool 
that enables extracting and exporting relational data from Excel files into adjacency matrices in .txt 




3.3. Variables and Measures 
For our empirical analysis, we estimate a model for the probability of auditor selection ties as a 
function of the two demand-side aspects derived from the supervisory directorship network, auditor 
selection network (exogenous/attribute effects) and network endogenous parameters. In the 
following, we explain the different elements of our model and highlight why it is important to account 
for network endogeneity in order to avoid spurious modeling results. 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3549760
 13 
3.3.1. The network 
The networks we developed and modeled for each year of observation are categorized as multilevel 
(Robins, 2015). A multilevel network is comprised of two types of nodes representing supervisory 
board members and audit partners, along with the ties connecting them (for a similar approach, see 
for instance Kacanski, 2017). Ties interconnecting supervisory board members represent their 
collaborations on particular boards, which indicate their direct connections or ‘pipes’ (Podolny, 2001) 
through which information on knowledge and experiences about auditor engagements are shared. The 
second group of ties shows the selection of audit partners made by supervisory board members. The 
fact that supervisory board members can simultaneously sit on multiple boards and thus create 
interlocks implies that they are, at the same time, connected with all the other board members on each 
board they represent. On the other hand, the ties between board representatives and audit partners 
indicate decisions that board members make on the appointment of audit partners. Those ties neglect 
other relations that boards can establish regarding other advisory services that audit firms might offer 
to the companies. All the ties are recorded dichotomously and arranged in ten binary adjacency 
matrices (two for each multilevel network) x = #$!"% in which cell $!" corresponds to i’s relation to 
inventory j. If i sits on the same board with j (in the top-level network), and if i engaged auditor j (in 
the meso-level network), cell $!" is coded as 1, and 0 if not, in both types of matrices. 
According to the multilevel network specifications, the two-level network is traditionally 
comprised of top, meso, and bottom levels (Robins, 2015). We present a simplified visualization of 
the multilevel network in Figure 1. In so doing, we indicate that, in this paper, we simultaneously and 
exclusively observed demand mechanisms from top- and meso-level perspectives (Robins, 2015; 
Kacanski, 2017; Lusher et al., 2013). The bottom level is omitted from the study following the 
assumption that audit partners do not have any direct influence on corporate decisions on auditor 
appointment (Baker, 1990; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2004). Even though the top-level network parameters 
do not directly relate to the hypotheses, it was necessary to include them in the network parameter 
estimations in order to provide insights into how the structures of corporate board networks condition 
the exchange of knowledge and experience among board representatives. Had those parameters been 
excluded from the models, they would not have provided stronger arguments for how corporate board 
network structures condition the auditor selection process.  
In the following visualization given in Figure 1, the top level represents the network 
comprised of supervisory board members (blue squares) and relations between them (dashed lines). 
We treat individual board members as nodes, rather than boards of directors as units (Seabright et al., 
1992). In this way, each unit of board of directors was transformed into clique-based network 
formations (Robins, 2015, Lusher et al., 2013) in order to account for the presence of individual board 
members on a single board of directors and ties between them. Those board members who represent 
boards in more than one company have ties established with all the other board members who sit on 
each company board they themselves are affiliated with (Baker, 1990; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2004; 
Courtney & Jubb, 2005). More concretely, the transformation of boards (firms) as single nodes into 
clique-based structures of board members enables deconstruction on simple triadic network 
configurations into complex multi-triadic formations. Clique-based structures convert firm-to-firm 
ties into the nodes of board members who establish ties across different boards. As a result, this 
approach enabled us to identify a function that more active (or more popular) board members who 
represent multiple boards have on auditor selection process across the boards. The omission of such 
an approach would limit our findings as incorporation of (ATA) parameter into the measurements of 
closure effects on firm-to-firm ties would only be capable of capturing function that firm clusters, 
which therefore connected through the interlocks, have on selection of auditors. However, following 
the theoretical assumption that SNA is built upon, the disaggregation of individual board 
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representatives from boards enabled us to account on actor’s individuality based on which we could 
measure the function that board members have on auditor selection process across multiple boards 
they represent and not only on firms as a whole, in which case that information would be missing. 
 
 
Figure 1- Schematic visualization of a multilevel network 
The meso-level network represents the choice of audit partners made by supervisory boards. 
Solid lines between the two levels (blue squares and red circles) indicate bi-partite (cross-level) 
network ties (Robins, 2015), where board members have ties established with those audit partners 
they engage to carry out the mandatory audits. Because boards appoint two audit partners affiliated 
with the same audit firm, the outcome of the network structure is that each board member has two 
solid ties with two audit partners affiliated within the same audit firm. In the cases of interlocking 
directorships, where one board member represents more than one corporate board (Baker, 1990; Uzzi 
& Lancaster, 2004; Courtney & Jubb, 2005), then those board members have ties established to all 
audit partners that were selected by each company that board member represents. In this case, we do 
not distinguish between the new and incumbent auditor (Johansen & Pettersson, 2013), as we analyze 
data from multiple cross-sectional perspectives taking into account the current audit engagements in 
the particular year of observation. 
 
3.3.2. Analytical framework – Exponential random graph models 
We analyze our data by applying exponential random graph models (ERGMs; for an introduction, 
see Lusher et al., 2013) to multilevel networks (Wang et al., 2013) as this methodology enables 
integration of both theoretical assumptions to identify the presence of an interplay between the 
mechanisms. 
ERGMs assume that social networks are comprised of local substructures representing social 
mechanisms that explain the presence of ties (Lusher et al., 2013). ERGMs have been developed to 
account for dependencies in network structures. The models they produce, describe patterns 
characterizing an observed network by modeling stochastic processes in which the presence of a 
particular tie is influenced by the presence or absence of other ties or exogenous attributes (Lusher et 
al., 2013). ERGMs have capacity to simultaneously estimate multiple parameters, where parameters 
account for the presence of the other network structural effects – which resemble the actual social 
processes (Robins, Pattison, Kalish, & Lusher, 2007). Unlike the other statistical approaches in the  
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Table 1. Summary of network effects included in exponential random graph models 
Pattern Visualization Interpretation 
Top-level structural parameters 
(control effects)   
 
Edge  
A baseline propensity to a tie formation – a control effect that is 




 Parameter measures the presence of highly central board members 
who are more popular than the others in the overall board 
membership network. It models the degree distribution. 
 
 
One-mode level closure parameter 
ATA 
  
Triadic closure parameter measures tendencies that particular pair 
of board members connects with multiple same other board 
members across the overall network. 
 
One-mode level clustering parameter -
indirect connectivity  
A2PA 
  
This parameter controls whether ties with multiple other board 
members establish without the existence of a tie between board 
members. Clustering parameter should have an opposite direction 
from closure parameter. 
 






A baseline propensity to a meso-level tie formation – a control effect 
that is normally included in any network model. 
 




Parameter measures the presence of highly central audit partners in 
the overall network structure. It indicates that those audit partners 
who are more popular than the others, are more likely to be selected. 
 




Triadic closure parameter measures tendencies that a pair of board 
members sitting on the same board at the entire network scale will 
select multiple same audit partners.   
 




Clustering effect controls for the closure effect and indicates that 
two board members who do not represent the same board will select 
the same multiple audit partners. This measure should have an 
opposite direction from closure parameter in this instance. 
 




This parameter measures the propensity that two audit partners are 






Board member engaging with auditor 




Parameter measures general tendency that board members will 
select audit partners who are reputable. 
Two board members engaging the 





Akin to the previous parameter, it measures the propensity that more 
board members select the same audit partner who is considered as 
reputable. 
Board member engaging with two 




Tendency that board members select more audit partners where all 
of them are considered as reputable. 
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family of network analyses, ERGMs do not operate at the dyadic level, but their outcome is the overall 
structure of the network. The models treat the whole network as a single observation, thus freeing it 
from any independence assumptions (Wang et al., 2013, 2016). As social ties imply dependence, we 
consider this to be a major strength of our modeling approach, which is of theoretical as well as 
empirical importance for the analysis of our research question. 
 Multilevel ERGMs enable us to account for complex top- and cross-level dependencies, such 
as the influence of corporate board structures on auditor selection processes through popularity and 
closure network effects. Stated formally, multilevel ERGMs express the probability of the overall 
network structure in terms of parameters associated with specific effects or local patterns within the 
network. They focus on the interaction between two networks – in our case, the supervisory board 
network and the board-auditor network. At the same time, they allow for taking into account auditors’ 
attributes as exogenous predictors of the network structure (Wang et al., 2013, 2016). Multilevel 
ERGMs have the general form: 
 
                          !"($ = &, ( = )) = +!", -./ +0 Θ#2#(&, ))# ,                                                               (1) 
where (i) & =	 [), +, ,]	denotes the multilevel network variable, and . =	 [/, $, 0] denotes the 
corresponding realizations. M is composed of a top-level network A (in our case the supervisory 
board member network), a meso-level network X (the network between supervisory board members 
and audit partners), and a bottom-level network B – the network of audit partners which is excluded 
from the study; (ii) Y is an array of actor attributes with realizations y; (iii) ZQ (m, y) is a network 
statistic counting the number of network patterns of type Q for a particular network realization m and 
given the vector of actor attributes y; (iv) ΘQ is the parameter corresponding to the statistic ZQ (m, y); 
and (v) k is a normalizing constant included to ensure that (1) is a proper probability distribution. The 
above equation describes a probability distribution of multilevel networks with u nodes at one level 
and v nodes at the other. The probability of observing any particular network m in this distribution 
(including the one that is actually being observed) is dependent both on the statistics ZQ (m, y) and 
the corresponding parameter values ΘQ for all effects in the model. 
 The objective of using ERGMs is to investigate which patterns characterize an observed 
network and, on that basis, to draw conclusions about the choice processes that determine the creation 
of ties. The patterns included in the model are determined by theory-based dependence assumptions 
regarding tie creation and exogenous effects – such as the recommendation and reputation demand 
mechanisms discussed above. To estimate our models, we use MPNet software (Wang et al., 2013) 
instead of RSiena (Ripley et al., 2018) by applying Markov chain Monte Carlo maximum likelihood 
(MCMCML) estimations (Snijders et al., 2006; van Duijn et al., 2009). We use ERGMs because this 
study is of a multiple cross-sectional character, where the aim is to estimate probabilities for tie 
emergence, instead of observing the process network change over time. If cross-panel repeated 
measures of network parameters on the same given set of nodes were our intention, then RSiena 
would have been a better fit for this study (Ripley et al., 2018). 
 
3.3.3. Network Endogenous and Exogenous Effects 
Prior research on social selection mechanisms (Lusher et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013) in corporate 
governance contexts has shown that networks are characterized by complex endogenous 
dependencies, as the creation of social selection ties is determined by individuals’ own patterns. To 
account for that tendency of social networks to self-organize into meaningful structural patterns 
(Robins et al., 2005), we include network endogenous effects. These effects represent theoretical 
claims on the processes that drive the emergence of network patterns and are thus more than 
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theoretical ameliorations (Lomi et al., 2014). Omitting network endogenous effects could lead to 
invalid findings on the effects that are of theoretical interest and as a result may be attributable to 
structural mechanisms driving the emergence of ties (Robins et al., 2007; Snijders, 2011). In order to 
isolate the social influence processes in auditor selection networks, we consider the network 
endogenous effects outlined in Table 1 as single and cross-level structural parameters. Controlling 
for the simplest form of dependence that exists at the dyadic level, we account for the overall tendency 
of board members to create ties with the other corporate board members (Edge) and auditors (XEdge). 
Since dyadic dependencies alone are insufficient to capture network endogenous effects (Lomi et al., 
2014; Robins et al., 2009; Snijders, 2011), we additionally take into account star parameters 
(popularity effect – ASA, XASA) and closure parameters (ATA, ATXAX). 
Both star parameters control for degree distribution of both top- and meso-level networks and 
reflect the findings that ties in social networks are seldom distributed evenly (Robins et al., 2009). 
We also include effects to capture clustering, specifically tendencies to create closure (Robins et al., 
2009), which is the tendency for ties to be created between individuals who already share common 
ties (Davis, 1970; Rank et al., 2010).  
Finally, we include exogenous attribute effects to account for the tendency of board members 
to create ties with those auditors holding the reputation attribute. The last section of Table 1 that refers 
to reputation interaction summarizes the attribute network patterns that refer to social selection 
processes, whose parameters were also estimated in the same models. Those particular attribute 
parameters are modelled to estimate general propensity for selection of reputable auditor (XEdgeB), 
tendencies for multiple boards members selection of particular reputable auditor (X2StarB010), but also 
selection of multiple reputable auditors by a single board member (X2Star101). 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive measures for the variables in our study. Sample sizes do not differ 
considerably from each other across the five-year period, considering the number of board 
representatives affiliated with the selected companies and the number of auditors engaged by those 
companies (145–165). There is a notable slight decline in both the number of boards of directors 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Sample information 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Number of companies 165 162 153 149 145 
Number of boards of directors 969 962 922 897 894 
Number of audit partners 186 188 167 160 162 




































Number of ties on top-level network 7926 7846 7630 7506 7501 
Number of ties on meso-level network 2019 2036 1927 1908 1831 
Density of board member network 0.89% 0.92% 0.88% 0.91% 0.87% 
Density of a meso-level auditor engagement network 0.24% 0.19% 0.22% 0.19% 0.20% 
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representing companies and the number of audit partners, which corresponds with the change in the 
number of listed companies on the stock exchange in that period.  
Although the relative decrease in the number of listed companies is apparent, the descriptive 
statistic measures and network statistics hold consistent values across the years. Values presented in 
this subsection represent the averages of values presented in Table 2 for the entire period. The average 
number of supervisory board members per board is 6.64, with a standard deviation of 2.62. The 
average number of audit partners responsible for audits is 1.88 per client with an average deviation 
of 0.46, which corresponds with the regulation on mandatory audits. Each Danish supervisory board 
has on average 1.12 interlocks, with a standard deviation of 0.43, which indicates that corporate 
governance networks are well interconnected within the public corporate governance structure, but 
also that not many multi-board positions are occupied by a single board member. Densities of both 
board and board-auditor networks are low, due to a large number of nodes and small number of ties 
connecting them, relative to the number of possible ties that might occur in the network. This is a 
result of both structural and regulatory boundaries that influenced localization of ties.  
  
4.2. Network Analysis 
Table 3 contains the results of model estimations for each observed year. The results in Table 3 are 
arranged into horizontal and vertical sections. The first horizontal section outlines parameter 
estimates related to top-level network structuring effects (supervisory board membership) for each of 
the five models. With respect to H1a, the second section in Table 3 provides the meso-level network 
parameters to outline the network statistics indicative of recommendation driven auditor selection 
mechanisms, also for each of five years of observation. The third part of the table comprises the 
attribute effects included in the exponential models to test H1b. On the other hand, vertical sections 
present the list and statistics for each network parameter introduced into the individual model. 
Conditional on all other patterns in the model, a positive parameter indicates that the pattern is 
observed more often in the network than we would expect if ties emerged randomly, while a negative 
parameter indicates that the pattern is observed less frequently. Similar to a logistic regression, the 
size of the parameter estimates can be interpreted in terms of (conditional) log odds. For every 
increase of a value by one unit, the conditional odds of observing the auditor engagement tie as a 
social selection mechanism increase by a factor that can be obtained by calculating the exponential 
function of the parameter (Hunter et al., 2008; Robins & Daraganova, 2013). 
With regard to our research question addressing the interplay of two demand mechanisms – 
recommendation and reputation - in the context of auditor selection processes, in general, the results 
of model estimations reveal that the networks in each year of observation are characterized by a 
number of both single- and multilevel patterns that emerge more or less often than expected from 
their random occurrences. Although the parameter estimates are not fully consistent across the years 
in terms of the strengths of the effects, clear trends concerning the structuring principles of multilevel 
networks were identified and presented below. In the following, we outline the findings by discussing 
the network statistics before we discuss the goodness of fit of the models. 
 
4.2.1. Results of the Exponential Random Graph Models 
Top-level and meso-network effects capture structuring principles of the supervisory board network 
and their selection of auditors. Theoretically driven selection of the structuring principles is 
accompanied by control parameters in order to enable a good fit of the models and provide model 
convergence (Wang et al., 2013, 2016). 




Table 3. Results of the exponential random graph models for selected years  
Network parameter Models 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Network endogenous patterns – board-level network                                           Parameter (st. dev.)               Parameter (st. dev.)               Parameter (st. dev.)             Parameter (st. dev.)           Parameter (st. dev.) 
Tie formation propensity - Edge -6.363* (0.738) -6.1576* (0.929) -7.6947* (0.651) -7.6168* (0.546) -6.579* (0.889) 
Star2A -0.3401* (0.013) -0.1188** (0.009) -0.0767** (0.011) -0.1577** (0.008) -0.0526* (0.009) 
Star3A - - - -0.0082* (0.001) - 
Star parameter - ASA 0.5767* (0.190) 0.5285* (1.377) 0.9533* (0.166) 0.9342* (0.144) 0.6804* (0.227) 
One-mode level closure - ATA 1.2425* (0.017) 1.0835** (0.023) 1.0897* (0.321) 1.5507** (0.023) 1.1763* (0.320) 
One-mode level indirect connectivity - A2PA -0.4307 (0.308) -0.3724 (0.213) -0.3700 (0.208) -0.4072 (0.337) -0.424 (0.246) 
Network endogenous patterns – board-auditor network (H1a) 
Tie formation propensity – two-mode - XEdge -7.1548* (0.087) -5.9081* (0.329) -5.7027* (0.367) -5.3702* (0.372) -6.9189* (0.107) 
XStar2B -0.0039 (0.003) - - - - 
Star parameter – popularity effect (B) XASB 0.9145** (0.028) 2.2892* (0.095) 2.9235* (0.106) 2.4421* (0.103) 0.8882** (0.034) 
Clustering – A node cluster XACA 1.9236* (0.087) 2.1141* (0.027) 2.9214* (0.104) 1.8336* (0.329) 2.6159* (0.104) 
Clustering – B node cluster XACB -0.7881 (0.594) -1.0325 (0.714) -0.6331 (0.462) -0.652 (0.331) -0.907 (0.646) 
Two-mode level closure parameter - ATXAX 1.9149* (0.058) 1.5623* (0.204) 1.8808* (0.084) 1.0176* (0.031) 1.5114* (0.026) 
Attribute effects – two mode social selection models (H1b) 
Audit firm reputation attribute effect 
General tendency toward selection of reputable auditor XEdgeB 0.2363* (0.102) 0.3010* (0.014) 0.2373* (0.087) 0.1423* (0.021) 0.3430* (0.012) 
Popularity effect for reputable auditor X2StarB010 0.1731* (0.055) 0.1254* (0.016) 0.3691* (0.143) 1.0191* (0.010) 0.4123* (0.114) 
Reputation effect – multiple selection X2StarB101 1.0510* (0.435) 1.0921* (0.322) 0.9912* (0.217) 1.0781* (0.314) 0.9891* (0.218) 
*     Indicates significant effect at Lambda = 2  The value of l = 2 has been used here as an initial value as it has been proven to be reasonable for many ERGMs estimations;  
**   Indicates significant effect at Lambda = 4  however, higher values, as indicated (l = 4), contribute convergence in the case of highly skewed degree distributions,  
(Koskinen & Daraganova, 2013; Robins et al., 2007) 
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Concerning H1a, with respect to structuring principles that address the influence of 
supervisory board ties on recommendation processes in an auditor selection context, we first find that 
star parameter (ASA) is positive and significant across each model. This parameter is indicative of  
the presence of highly centralized supervisory board members, which shows that some board 
members who, by holding relatively higher degree distributions of relational ties with the others in 
the top-level network, are particularly sought-after as actors possessing relatively more knowledge 
on experiences with auditors. This could be a result of better knowledge provision, or those 
supervisory board members might be known as reputable among colleagues (Lusher et al., 2013), 
which could trigger tendencies toward preferential attachment, e.g. the Matthew effect. Their more 
central position in the network may indicate that the other supervisory boards tend to achieve better 
proximity with sought-after auditors. Closure parameter (ATA) is also positive and significant in all 
models, indicating that there is a tendency for ties to be created between board members who share 
common ties. We assume that positive closure parameter is not primarily a result of the clique-based 
network formations due to relatively small standard deviation of an average number of members per 
board of directors, but the interlocks that some board members tend to establish with the members at 
multiple boards.  
In addition, we tested the two-mode level closure effect (ATXAX). The closure effect is positive 
and significant across models, showing that ties developing between supervisory board members 
condition the presence of ties between supervisory boards and audit partners. In other words, ties 
between board members direct the selection of multiple same audit partners, which corresponds to 
H1a that, asides from the supervisory directors representing the same boards, interlocks are also 
influential to the selection of auditors. This indicates that knowledge and experiences on quality of 
audits is spread among board members, which further drives the auditor selection process across the 
entire network, also through interlocks. This finding corresponds with the (ATA) parameter where low 
standard deviation across the observations indicate strong influence of interlocks on engagement 
partner selection across boards, and also that the significant parameter is not merely an indication of 
a mechanical consequence of transformation of firm-to-firm ties into clique-based board member 
network structures. Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that the recommendation mechanism 
plays an important role in auditor selection processes, and therefore, these findings support H1a.       
Regarding H1b relating to the structuring principles and attribute effects of the reputation-
driven auditor selection mechanism, we integrated the auditor popularity effect (XASB) with the list of 
attribute effects to indicate interaction between boards and reputable auditors (as the attribute 
holders). Parameter statistics in all models captured both positive and significant auditor 
centralization, indicating the presence of a few popular audit partners in the overall network who hold 
a relatively higher degree distribution compared to other audit partners in the same network. Also, 
the auditor-centered clustering effect (XACA) was included to test whether multiple auditors tended to 
be selected by multiple same other supervisory board members. Parameter statistics for this 
configuration are positive and significant. These results are accompanied by three attribute 
interaction effects: general tendency toward selection of a reputable auditor (XEdgeB), tendencies for 
preferential selection of the same reputable auditor by multiple other board members (XStarB010), and 
board members’ tendency to select multiple reputable auditors (XStarB101). Model estimations showed 
that across five models, all attribute effects are positive and significant. First, board members have a 
general tendency toward engaging audit partners who are considered reputable. Second, multiple 
board members are more likely to select the same reputable auditor. Lastly, single board members 
tend to engage multiple reputable audit partners. Those findings fully support our H1b. 
We included the remaining patterns as control variables to account for the influences that 
alternative parameters have on demand mechanisms in the auditor selection processes. The indirect 
connectivity or clustering effect (A2PA) was included to control for the closure effect in top networks, 
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which has a negative and insignificant parameter estimate. Similarly, the clustering effect in meso-
level networks (XACB) was used to control for the presence of the bi-partite closure effect, and similar 
to the previous estimate, is also negative and insignificant. 
Concerning the network endogenous control variables, the negative (Edge) and (XEdge) effects 
indicate that, on one hand, it is rare for supervisory board members to create ties with the other board 
members outside of the other, more complex patterns included in the models. On the other hand, the 
same rule applies to board members’ ties with audit partners, where a negative and significant 
parameter value shows that boards and auditors rarely establish relations outside the more complex 
structural patterns that characterize the observed network. 
Finally, considering that the test of hypotheses H1a and H1b showed that, in joint observation 
of social influence and social selection processes, both mechanisms are positive and significant, we 
can conclude that, on one hand, mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and on the other hand, they 
form an interplay to establish the platform for unfolding of the auditor selection network. Based on 
those results, we find the support for H2.  
 
4.2.2. Goodness of Fit 
Based on the procedure suggested by Hunter et al. (2008), we assessed the goodness of fit for each 
model after the models converged. Goodness of fit (GOF) enables assessing how well the model 
manages to capture features of data that were not explicitly modelled. More concretely, it estimates 
whether the combination of the selected network parameters is sufficient enough to explain the 
observed network structure. Technically, the GOF analysis requires inclusion of all the parameters, 
both those that were included and those that were not included in the models. Following Hunter et al. 
(2008) recommendation, we simulated 1,000 samples over 100 million iterations to produce a high 
number of graphs from the fitted models and compare the characteristics of simulated graphs with 
the characteristics of the observed models. In order to assess whether a summary measure !!(#"#$) 
for the observed graph is far from expected values under the fitted model, we calculated the 
standardized difference [!!(#"#$) − '̅!]/!+,!!(#)-, where '̅! and !+,!!(#)- represent mean and 
standard deviation, respectively, which are calculated over the generated graphs (Lusher et al. 2013). 
Given that we estimated models based on 13 and 14 different parameters for which the estimation 
algorithm converged, we simulated networks from the models to generate distribution of graphs by 
including, in total, 54 network statistics.  
According to the goodness of fit test, the summary of the corresponding feature in data is not 
extreme in the all distributions of graphs for each model. Building on criteria recommended by Wang 
et al. (2013), the results of our models demonstrate a good fit, as the GOF analysis for all network 
parameters included in the models demonstrated that t-values for the selected parameters were below 
the threshold of 0.1, and the values for all other parameters not included into the initial models were 
below 2.0 in their absolute values. In addition, we also measured standard deviation and skewness of 
the degree distributions for the entire model goodness of fit for each year. As a result, both of the 
measures were below 2. Particularly, standard deviations ranged between 0.7 and 1.4, whereas 
skewness ranged from 0.5 and 1.6, which suggests a good fit based on which we can assume that 
observed networks can be adequately reproduced based on the model estimations. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Both recommendation and reputation represent valuable assets and important sources of auditor 
selection mechanisms (Davis & Robbins, 2004; Granovetter, 1973; Nelson, 1970; Podolny, 2001; 
Powell, 1990; Saxton, 1997; Johansen & Pettersson, 2013; Kacanski, 2017). In this study, we utilize 
a conceptual duality of demand mechanisms to investigate the dilemma of how the two selection 
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processes create an interplay in an auditor selection context. Taking a multilevel network approach 
to enable the integration of structural and attribute parameters specific to both theoretical arguments, 
our results show that both recommendation and reputation mechanisms simultaneously impact 
auditor selection processes. 
The research was conducted based on the premise that social selection processes should be 
observed holistically (Robins, 2015), suggesting that, in order to comprehend the evolution of 
selection processes, it is imperative to integrate all variables that could be decisive in a particular 
research context (Granovetter, 1973) to observe both demand mechanisms (Powell, 1990; Saxton, 
1997; Johansen & Pettersson, 2013; Kacanski, 2017). The network theory and ERGMs we used here 
(Wang et al., 2013; Lusher et al., 2013) enabled us to combine two theoretical paradigms, irrespective 
of variables, with the purpose of challenging their co-existence and identifying the interdependencies 
between the two demand logics (Davis & Robbins, 2004; Granovetter, 1973; Nelson, 1970; Podolny, 
2001; Powell, 1990; Saxton, 1997; Johansen & Pettersson, 2013; Kacanski, 2017). This is because 
the theory of social network analysis and the concept of interdependency argue that social processes 
do not occur in a vacuum; multiple and various social activities and conditions influence corporate 
decisions (Robins, 2015). Additionally, to extend our knowledge and better understand multifaceted 
aspects of demand mechanisms, our study also makes use of the newly emerging field of multilevel 
network studies (Wang et al., 2018; Lazega et al., 2008). 
Our findings correspond with Podolny’s (2001) assumption that the recommendation 
mechanism serves as ‘pipes’ for spreading the information among closures in order to trigger 
selection and preferential attachment. We find that visibility and position of board members in the 
corporate board network plays an important role in terms of how board members are assembled. The 
development of corporate board networks gives us a clear indication that the structures of relations 
between individual supervisory board members within and across boards tend to develop by 
following the principle of proximity-to-auditor strategies (Baker, 1990; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2004; 
Courtney & Jubb, 2005). This is further proved by the finding that the network is characterized by a 
presence of those supervisory board members who are more popular than the others. That finding 
corresponds well with the assumption that the more knowledge and experience individuals have, the 
more sought-after they become to others (Bizjak, Lemmon, & Whitby, 2009; Bouwman, 2011; Chiu, 
Teoh, & Tian, 2009; Davis & Greve, 1997; Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Haunschild, 1993). 
Furthermore, we find that supervisory board members organize themselves in closures, which shows 
that board members organize themselves in a type of network configuration where ties tend to be 
formed between individuals who share common ties (Davis, 1970; Rank et al., 2010). This indicates 
that acknowledging that a focal individual with the necessary knowledge about experience goods is 
found to attract others who might be interested in gaining that knowledge (Beattie & Fearnley, 1998; 
Magri & Baldacchino, 2004).  
With regard to the recommendation-based auditor selection process, we find that the presence 
of ties between boards of directors condition the engagement of audit partners. In particular, the 
choice of audit partner does not occur by random, but is strongly determined by the presence of board 
members on the same board. This finding is not unsurprising per se due to two assumptions integrated 
into this study. Firstly, because our network includes interlock ties, which makes the observation 
more complex as denser regions tend to appear at the top-level network, and secondly, because of the 
presence of more popular audit partners in the network.  
Additionally, our findings are in alignment with the proposition that reputation plays a role in 
the auditor selection mechanism as well (Linthicum et al., 2010; Magri & Baldacchino, 2004; 
Kacanski, 2017). Similarly, reputation also drives the emergence of ties between clients and auditors 
(Magri & Baldacchino, 2004). A board’s interest in engaging reputable auditors is possibly driven by 
its expectations to improve perceptions and awareness of their current and potential shareholders, 
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which could result in higher share values. Results show that supervisory boards tend to select auditors 
who are preferably affiliated with the Big Four rather than the non-Big Four. The results appear to 
show that interlocking directorships are not only driven by the same principle, but by combining the 
reputation effect with the auditor popularity effect, they have a strong influence on aligning corporate 
decisions across multiple boards. This may be also attributed to the effect of corporate strategies 
related to increasing proximity with desired auditors, which implies that sharing knowledge and 
experiences through cross-board ties causes assimilation in corporate decisions, where boards, in 
return, tend to engage reputable auditors rather than non-reputable ones. That argument supports the 
assumption that duality of demand mechanisms (recommendation and reputation) should not be 
understood from an exclusive point of view (Davis & Robbins, 2004; Granovetter, 1973; Nelson, 
1970; Podolny, 2001; Powell, 1990; Saxton, 1997; Johansen & Pettersson, 2013; Kacanski, 2017). It 
is possible to argue for their co-existence in the mutuality of demand mechanisms, and they should 
be jointly observed. This is not only because part of any explanation might be missing if the 
alternative mechanism is excluded, but particularly because reputation nowadays seems to be 
recognized as one of the fundamental driving mechanisms in demand processes in the market for 
experience goods, and not only in the audit market (Brewer et al., 2002; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). 
Lastly, none of the models showed deviations from the pattern found across the five years, indicating 
stable and consistent results, but also a reasonably good match of samples irrespective of the changes 
in the sampled companies across the models that resulted from the listing and delisting of business 
entities on the Nasdaq OMX Copenhagen. 
To conclude, ties and configurations at one network level impact both the presence and 
absence of ties at other network levels, and as a result affect the overall system of interactions. Equally 
important, our study provides evidence that multilevel network patterns emerge in and across 
organizations based on the social mechanisms behind them. In this sense, we proposed that relational 
mechanisms, such as popularity spread within and across triadic closures that were identified in both 
the top-level and the meso-level network, could be utilized to better comprehend more complex 
network structures at different levels. The study intrinsically builds on previous research in 
accounting and auditing by combining organizational theory and methodology in order to intensify 
the significance of insights that in such a field could be contributive by emphasizing the relevance of 
network research. In this sense, our study is practically meaningful as it offers important implications 
for organizational design by considering corporate governance within and across organizational 
structures, along with collaborative engagements related to auditor selection processes. 
By exploring the duality of demand-side mechanisms in an auditor selection context, we 
contribute to multilevel research on networks, accounting and auditing, and corporate governance. 
Particularly, we add to social network research on duality of demand mechanisms related to 
differentiation of experience goods, looking at service-oriented contexts. While there have been calls 
in the literature to analyze the cross-level generalizability of reputation (Beattie & Fearnley, 1998; 
Magri & Baldacchino, 2004), to the best of our knowledge there are no studies on this task that 
incorporate the alternative demand mechanism. Lastly, we add to the theory by examining 
competition between the two mechanisms by utilizing statistical models for social networks – 
exponential random graph models (Wang et al., 2018) – to open up the space for theoretical discussion 
on the interplay between two competitive processes. 
This study has several limitations that should be considered in future research. First, though 
the choice of a single national context has some obvious limitations because it is difficult to extend 
conclusions to other contexts, such an approach was necessary as both data and analysis are sensitive 
to the institutional setting. Second, we were only able to capture auditor selection mechanisms at one 
point in time, so we could not discuss the process perspective involved in the change of selection 
mechanisms. This is because the temporal structure of our data necessitated that we concentrate on a 
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cross-sectional instead of a longitudinal dimension. However, this approach prevented us from 
identifying and incorporating information on the sequence of actions in relation to the development 
of interlocks and changes in board structures. Third, this study employs a straightforward binary value 
to categorize reputation and measure the presence of the effect in the network. This is due to the lack 
of official measurements were lacking for audit firms. Still, it is to be expected that, similarly to other 
industries, audit firms belonging to the Big Four network might also have different reputation scores, 
and therefore, could be observed with varying degrees of reputability. One such case likely happened 
in Denmark in 2014, when two Big Four audit firms decided to merge. Finally, this study does not 
take into account the sensitivity of demand mechanisms related to the audit fee effect and the 
willingness of clients to pay audit premiums to engage reputable auditors. 
Future research should address those issues by exploiting the methodologies for capturing not 
only the reputation scores on a wider scale of business entities, including audit firms and individuals 
within audit firms, but audit fees as well. Also, it would be interesting to investigate a similar question 
in different corporate contexts and different regions in order to increase the generalizability of the 
study. Lastly, it would be appealing to explore a recent audit merger in Denmark between KPMG and 
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